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LibAFF4 is an implementation of the AFF4 standard. It is still in a very early stage of development but it allows people to have a play with the new standard. This page documents it.

Obtaining LibAFF4

The source code is currently kept under version control on the main PyFlag server. It can be fetched using:

darcs get

Once the AFF4 directory is downloaded, a configure file needs to be created:

sh ./configure make install

The following libraries are mandatory:

  • openssl-dev
  • uuid-dev

The following are optional but recommended libraries:

  • libcurl4-openssl-dev
  • libfuse-dev

Taking an image

Probably the first step is to actually acquire the image. Right now there is no fancy interface or GUI - its just a simple commandline:

AFF4/tools$ sudo aff4imager -i -o /tmp/ /dev/sda1
Imaging Mode selected
Dumping segment urn:aff4:dd3102c1-370d-4b15-83e7-5a1991b5a9e1/00000000 (55425084 bytes)
Dumping segment urn:aff4:dd3102c1-370d-4b15-83e7-5a1991b5a9e1/00000001 (33314018 bytes)
Dumping segment urn:aff4:dd3102c1-370d-4b15-83e7-5a1991b5a9e1/00000002 (3011613 bytes)
Dumping segment urn:aff4:dd3102c1-370d-4b15-83e7-5a1991b5a9e1/00000003 (51756091 bytes)
Creating a link object 'default' for stream 'urn:aff4:dd3102c1-370d-4b15-83e7-5a1991b5a9e1'

We can see the imager dumping a new zip file with the default settings. By default bevies are 64Mb in size. The aff4imager tool reports each new bevy which is saved to disk and the size it ended up taking (after compression). Finally we see a link object is created to the new stream to make it easier to access it (so we dont need to remember the long URN for it).

Applying the Sleuthkit patch

There is a patch to sleuthkit for adding support to AFF4. The patch is against sleuthkit-3.0.1.

tar -xvzf sleuthkit-3.0.1.tgz
cd sleuthkit-3.0.1
patch -p1 < /path/to/AFF4/patches/sleuthkit-3.0.1.patch

## The following is needed to get the autoconf system to pick up the changes
libtoolize --force
aclocal -I config

## Now build it as normal
make install

Currently the Sluethkit patch does not work with autodetection - hence it must be specified explicitely using -i aff4.

AFF4 is a bit different since it refers not only to a volume, but to a stream within the volume. The convension is to specify the stream as the last parameter after the volumes. So for example, to open the stream created in the example above:

$ fls -i aff4 /tmp/ default
zip.c:51 - FileBackedObject_Con: Can't open file:///tmp/ (Not a directory)
libaff4.c:27 - open_volume: Loaded zip volume file:///tmp/
zip.c:51 - FileBackedObject_Con: Can't open file://default/__URN__ (No such file or directory)
zip.c:51 - FileBackedObject_Con: Can't open file://default (No such file or directory)
libaff4.c:100 - aff4_open: Trying to open stream default relative to all volumes
libaff4.c:107 - aff4_open: Trying urn:aff4:aeb9ed57-8dbe-4506-9fb8-e4106bf0767d/default
libaff4.c:122 - aff4_open: Using urn:aff4:dd3102c1-370d-4b15-83e7-5a1991b5a9e1 as the stream name
d/d 11:	lost+found
r/r 10043:
r/r 6025:	vmlinuz-2.6.22-14-generic
r/r 10041:	config-2.6.22-14-generic
r/r 10042:	abi-2.6.22-14-generic
r/r 13:	initrd.img-2.6.22-14-generic
d/c 44177:	grub
r/r 6029:	initrd.img-2.6.24-21-generic
r/r 12:	initrd.img-2.6.22-14-generic.bak

The debugging messages above are instructive to explain the logic of how libaff4 opens the volumes. Since you can specify any number of volumes of the command line you can see that libaff4 first tries to open the volume as a directory volume, if that fails, it tries to open it as a zip file. The last element is assumed to be a volume name and if no such volume is found, its assumed to be a stream name. Then the stream name is searched in all the volumes specified. Finally the stream name is resolved (since its a link it returns the URN of the original stream).

Signing images

The easiest way to get a private key and a corresponding X.509 certificate is to make a self-signed certificate using the openssl command.

    openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout sign.key -out sign.key -nodes

This command will ask you a bunch of questions; the results are stored in the file sign.crt. When you create a signed AFF4 file the certificate will be stored in the file, so be careful what you say. Alternatively, you can create an RSA private/public key pair, create a certificate request (CSR), send the CSR to a certificate authority, and use the certificate that the authority sends you back.

Note that this puts both the key and the self-signed certificate in the same file. That's fine for our purposes. The certificate will be copied into the AFF4 volume, but the private key will never be copied.

You can view the contents the certificate with this openssl command:

    openssl x509 -text -in sign.key

By loading the key and crt files, libaff4 will add the hash of each new segment written to a new statement. When the file is closed, the statement will be written to the volume.

$ aff4imager -i -o /tmp/ --key sign.key --cert sign.key /dev/sda1
Imaging Mode selected
identity.c:58 - Identity_load_certs: Will now sign using private key file://sign.key
identity.c:88 - Identity_load_certs: Will use public key from file://sign.key to verify signatures
Dumping segment urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000000 (55425084 bytes)
Dumping segment urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000001 (33314018 bytes)
Dumping segment urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000002 (3011613 bytes)
Dumping segment urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000003 (51756091 bytes)
Creating a link object 'default' for stream 'urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f'

zip.c:746 - ZipFile_open_member: Volume does not contain member urn:aff4:identity/41:38:13:1b:96:d3:f6:65:e0:87:60:07:f5:ff:31:19:24:93:e0:13/cert.pem

The last debug statement indicates that the certificate file in not present in the volume, therefore it is added. It is instructive to see what segments are present in the zip volume:

$ unzip -l /tmp/ 
Archive:  /tmp/
  Length     Date   Time    Name
 --------    ----   ----    ----
 55425084  04-25-09 21:54   urn%3Aaff4%3Afda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000000
     8196  04-25-09 21:54   urn%3Aaff4%3Afda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000000.idx
 33314018  04-25-09 21:54   urn%3Aaff4%3Afda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000001
     8196  04-25-09 21:54   urn%3Aaff4%3Afda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000001.idx
  3011613  04-25-09 21:54   urn%3Aaff4%3Afda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000002
     8196  04-25-09 21:54   urn%3Aaff4%3Afda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000002.idx
 51756091  04-25-09 21:54   urn%3Aaff4%3Afda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000003
     6552  04-25-09 21:54   urn%3Aaff4%3Afda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000003.idx
      209  04-25-09 21:54   urn%3Aaff4%3Afda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/properties
      115  04-25-09 21:54   default/properties
     1251  04-25-09 21:54   urn%3Aaff4%3Aidentity/41%3A38%3A13%3A1b%3A96%3Ad3%3Af6%3A65%3Ae0%3A87%3A60%3A07%3Af5%3Aff%3A31%3A19%3A24%3A93%3Ae0%3A13/00000000
      128  04-25-09 21:54   urn%3Aaff4%3Aidentity/41%3A38%3A13%3A1b%3A96%3Ad3%3Af6%3A65%3Ae0%3A87%3A60%3A07%3Af5%3Aff%3A31%3A19%3A24%3A93%3Ae0%3A13/00000000.sig
     3820  04-25-09 21:54   urn%3Aaff4%3Aidentity/41%3A38%3A13%3A1b%3A96%3Ad3%3Af6%3A65%3Ae0%3A87%3A60%3A07%3Af5%3Aff%3A31%3A19%3A24%3A93%3Ae0%3A13/cert.pem
      242  04-25-09 21:54   urn%3Aaff4%3Aidentity/41%3A38%3A13%3A1b%3A96%3Ad3%3Af6%3A65%3Ae0%3A87%3A60%3A07%3Af5%3Aff%3A31%3A19%3A24%3A93%3Ae0%3A13/properties
 --------                   -------
143543711                   14 files

As can be seen, the certificate is stored within the volume. Lets have a look at the statement:

$ unzip -p /tmp/ urn%3Aaff4%3Aidentity/41%3A38%3A13%3A1b%3A96%3Ad3%3Af6%3A65%3Ae0%3A87%3A60%3A07%3Af5%3Aff%3A31%3A19%3A24%3A93%3Ae0%3A13/00000000
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000000 aff4:sha256=RaOr4ksNZo+bXKMYDw2hwaAMqV9/4/TXqTE1P/7ERO8=
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000000.idx aff4:sha256=k4uSgGyYp0xeBdnpCWAY4sJilijn9sU9nmRkbzPl5LQ=
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000001 aff4:sha256=0Xf/VVaJe2RZ8eH9ACUTHWp8TXYdq5a/7hkdTn1eYGU=
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000001.idx aff4:sha256=9szVqgGIFHT7OxtWiopk7rP4HSsl4H+nHmnNVhqSjLg=
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000002 aff4:sha256=P6jENcyLn137Jl5QNCauQvviIXR/VSp7o7r0iNUDHX0=
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000002.idx aff4:sha256=EzXJ4eyJNYzKCUVc1U3vRzgLA+GhLCmsSkkcwholeqs=
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000003 aff4:sha256=ImM/kFyvDqkWa3A6HitIFtJaXf2gWpEx8knYWSMiVoE=
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000003.idx aff4:sha256=Lm2yB+tVw8yB1ia9MXIxkdRT8oXk1/2db9sFg48ZuoM=
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/properties aff4:sha256=9h9x5sd7ZxCKqWbcdLYVq7MM9AH7c6BI5DpCJrxCXUc=
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f aff4:sha256=fuy15WT9G5YpAh6PdLGxeCezoWtV6QryqnOhYvnV1Fc=
urn:aff4:89f8ec58-13f0-4ad4-b1f2-74da7f3aed40/default/properties aff4:sha256=2uxWY7B51oUa94B3hMU1iF1vZUNUdFPo/hNDUIrduCA=

Verifying signatures and inspecting AFF4 files

We wish to verify the above volume and learn more about the objects contained within it:

$ aff2imager -l /tmp/ -V -I 
zip.c:51 - FileBackedObject_Con: Can't open file:///tmp/ (Not a directory)
libaff4.c:27 - open_volume: Loaded zip volume file:///tmp/
Info mode selected
identity.c:88 - Identity_load_certs: Will use public key from urn:aff4:identity/41:38:13:1b:96:d3:f6:65:e0:87:60:07:f5:ff:31:19:24:93:e0:13/cert.pem to verify signatures
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000000 (segment): (OK)              
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000000.idx (segment): (OK)              
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000001 (segment): (OK)              
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000001.idx (segment): (OK)              
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000002 (segment): (OK)              
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000002.idx (segment): (OK)              
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000003 (segment): (OK)              
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000003.idx (segment): (OK)              
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/properties (image): (OK)              
urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f (segment): (OK)              
urn:aff4:89f8ec58-13f0-4ad4-b1f2-74da7f3aed40/default/properties (segment): 0 MB
******** Object urn:aff4:89f8ec58-13f0-4ad4-b1f2-74da7f3aed40 ***********
	aff4:stored = file:///tmp/
	aff4:type = zip_volume
	aff4:interface = volume
	aff4:contains = urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000000
	aff4:contains = urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000000.idx
	aff4:contains = urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000001
	aff4:contains = urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000001.idx
	aff4:contains = urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000002
	aff4:contains = urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000002.idx
	aff4:contains = urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000003
	aff4:contains = urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000003.idx
	aff4:contains = urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/properties
	aff4:contains = urn:aff4:89f8ec58-13f0-4ad4-b1f2-74da7f3aed40/default/properties
	aff4:contains = urn:aff4:identity/41:38:13:1b:96:d3:f6:65:e0:87:60:07:f5:ff:31:19:24:93:e0:13/00000000
	aff4:contains = urn:aff4:identity/41:38:13:1b:96:d3:f6:65:e0:87:60:07:f5:ff:31:19:24:93:e0:13/00000000.sig
	aff4:contains = urn:aff4:identity/41:38:13:1b:96:d3:f6:65:e0:87:60:07:f5:ff:31:19:24:93:e0:13/cert.pem
	aff4:contains = urn:aff4:identity/41:38:13:1b:96:d3:f6:65:e0:87:60:07:f5:ff:31:19:24:93:e0:13/properties

******** Object file:///tmp/ ***********
	aff4:contains = urn:aff4:89f8ec58-13f0-4ad4-b1f2-74da7f3aed40

******** Object urn:aff4:fda4d4fa-c378-4a06-acac-06ff54f49d5f/00000000 ***********
	aff4:stored = urn:aff4:89f8ec58-13f0-4ad4-b1f2-74da7f3aed40
	aff4:type = segment
	aff4:interface = stream
	aff4:timestamp = 0x49F2F9E2
	aff4:size = 0x34DB83C
	aff4:sha256 = RaOr4ksNZo+bXKMYDw2hwaAMqV9/4/TXqTE1P/7ERO8=
		---> Signed by urn:aff4:identity/41:38:13:1b:96:d3:f6:65:e0:87:60:07:f5:ff:31:19:24:93:e0:13


There is no need to specify certificates now since the certificate is given in the volume itself. The -V flag asks each object in the statement to be verified. We see as each object's hash is matched, an "(OK)" is printed.

Finally we see all the attributes of all the objects stored in the volumes specified. If any of these fact are also verified in an identity statement, we see a message indicating who signed this segment (The identity name is the certificate fingerprint).