Difference between revisions of "Open Research Topics"
From Forensics Wiki
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m (Removed potential sponsors; people seemed to be shy about adding their ideas. If nobody else adds, I'll probably delete this page.) |
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; Research Ideas | ; Research Ideas | ||
| − | Interested in doing research in computer forensics? Looking for a master's topic, or just some ideas for a research paper? Here is our list. Please feel free to add your own ideas | + | Interested in doing research in computer forensics? Looking for a master's topic, or just some ideas for a research paper? Here is our list. Please feel free to add your own ideas. |
=Hard Problems= | =Hard Problems= | ||
| − | * Stream Based Disk Forensics. Process the entire disk with one pass, or at most two, to minimize seek time. | + | * Stream Based Disk Forensics. Process the entire disk with one pass, or at most two, to minimize seek time. |
* Determine the device that created an image or video without metadata. | * Determine the device that created an image or video without metadata. | ||
* Automatically detect falsified digital evidence. | * Automatically detect falsified digital evidence. | ||
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* Modify aimage so that it can take a partial disk image and a disk and just image what's missing. | * Modify aimage so that it can take a partial disk image and a disk and just image what's missing. | ||
* Improve the data recovery features of aimage. | * Improve the data recovery features of aimage. | ||
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==Stored Data Forensics== | ==Stored Data Forensics== | ||
* Automatically determine a system's clock skew by comparing timestamps on HTML files with internal time stamps. | * Automatically determine a system's clock skew by comparing timestamps on HTML files with internal time stamps. | ||
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* What can you tell about a hard drive by picking 10000 random sectors? (They have to be random to prevent an adversary from simply hiding data in sectors where you aren't looking.) | * What can you tell about a hard drive by picking 10000 random sectors? (They have to be random to prevent an adversary from simply hiding data in sectors where you aren't looking.) | ||
==Decoders and Validators== | ==Decoders and Validators== | ||
* A JPEG decompresser that supports restarts and checkpointing for use in high-speed carving. It would also be useful it the JPEG decompressor didn't actually decompress --- all it needs to do is to verify the huffman table. | * A JPEG decompresser that supports restarts and checkpointing for use in high-speed carving. It would also be useful it the JPEG decompressor didn't actually decompress --- all it needs to do is to verify the huffman table. | ||
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==Cell Phones== | ==Cell Phones== | ||
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* Imaging the contents of a cell phone memory | * Imaging the contents of a cell phone memory | ||
* Reassembling information in a cell phone memory | * Reassembling information in a cell phone memory | ||
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==Flash Memory== | ==Flash Memory== | ||
Flash memory devices such as USB keys implement a [http://www.st.com/stonline/products/literature/an/10122.htm wear leveling algorithm] in hardware so that frequently rewritten blocks are actually written to many different physical blocks. Are there any devices that let you access the raw flash cells underneath the wear leveling chip? Can you get statistics out of the device? Can you access pages that have been mapped out (and still have valid data) but haven't been mapped back yet? Can you use this as a technique for accessing deleted information? | Flash memory devices such as USB keys implement a [http://www.st.com/stonline/products/literature/an/10122.htm wear leveling algorithm] in hardware so that frequently rewritten blocks are actually written to many different physical blocks. Are there any devices that let you access the raw flash cells underneath the wear leveling chip? Can you get statistics out of the device? Can you access pages that have been mapped out (and still have valid data) but haven't been mapped back yet? Can you use this as a technique for accessing deleted information? | ||
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Revision as of 23:04, 3 August 2008
- Research Ideas
Interested in doing research in computer forensics? Looking for a master's topic, or just some ideas for a research paper? Here is our list. Please feel free to add your own ideas.
Contents |
Hard Problems
- Stream Based Disk Forensics. Process the entire disk with one pass, or at most two, to minimize seek time.
- Determine the device that created an image or video without metadata.
- Automatically detect falsified digital evidence.
- Use the location of where data resides on a computer as a way of inferring information about the computer's past.
- Detect and diagnose sanitization attempts.
- Recover overwritten data.
Tool Development
AFF Enhancement
AFF is the Advanced Forensics Format, developed by Simson Garfinkel and Basis Technology.
- Evaluation of the AFF data page size. What is the optimal page size for compressed forensic work?
- Replacement of the AFF "BADFLAG" approach for indicating bad data with a bitmap.
- Modify aimage so that it can take a partial disk image and a disk and just image what's missing.
- Improve the data recovery features of aimage.
Stored Data Forensics
- Automatically determine a system's clock skew by comparing timestamps on HTML files with internal time stamps.
- What can you tell about a hard drive by picking 10000 random sectors? (They have to be random to prevent an adversary from simply hiding data in sectors where you aren't looking.)
Decoders and Validators
- A JPEG decompresser that supports restarts and checkpointing for use in high-speed carving. It would also be useful it the JPEG decompressor didn't actually decompress --- all it needs to do is to verify the huffman table.
Cell Phones
Open source tools for:
- Imaging the contents of a cell phone memory
- Reassembling information in a cell phone memory
Flash Memory
Flash memory devices such as USB keys implement a wear leveling algorithm in hardware so that frequently rewritten blocks are actually written to many different physical blocks. Are there any devices that let you access the raw flash cells underneath the wear leveling chip? Can you get statistics out of the device? Can you access pages that have been mapped out (and still have valid data) but haven't been mapped back yet? Can you use this as a technique for accessing deleted information?
Corpora Development
Real Corpora
- Cell phone memory images
Realistic Corpora
- Simulated disk imags
- Simulated network traffic
External Links
- Document & Media Exploitation - Paper by Dr. Simson Garfinkel which highlights some large and open problems in computer forensics
