Difference between pages "Bibliography" and "User:Helixgroup"

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m (Disk Disposal and Data Recovery)
 
(Sat 19 Nov 2005 (6:21PM EDT) Latest Draft, Now Document...)
 
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=Disk Disposal and Data Recovery=
+
''The danger in using a wiki as a collaboration tool is that other people will edit it.  
* [http://www.deepspar.com/pdf/DeepSparDiskImagingWhitepaper3.pdf Disk Imaging: A Vital Step in Data Recovery], DeepSpar Data Recovery Systems, November 2006. An in depth look at the many issues that cause data loss / irretrievable data in the data recovery imaging process and how to overcome them.
+
* [http://www.actionfront.com/ts_whitepaper.asp Drive-Independent Data Recovery: The Current State-of-the-Art], ActionFront Data Recovery Labs, August 2005.
+
* [[Recovering Overwritten Data#The Gutmann Paper|Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory]], Peter Gutmann, Proceedings of the Sixth Usenix Security Symposium, 1996. [http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/secure_del.html]
+
* [http://www-03.ibm.com/financing/pdf/us/recovery/igf4-a032.pdf Hard Drive Disposal: The Overlooked Confidentiality Exposure], FInancial Perspectives, IBM White Paper, November 2003.
+
  
<bibtex>
+
Information on cryptographic file system was moved to [[File Systems#Cryptographic File Systems]]
@Article{garfinkel:remembrance,
+
  author =      "Simson Garfinkel and Abhi Shelat",
+
  author_a =      "Simson L. Garfinkel and Abhi Shelat",
+
  title =        "Remembrance of Data Passed",
+
  journal =      "{IEEE} Security and Privacy Magazine",
+
  publisher =    "IEEE",
+
  year      =        "2002",
+
  month    = Jan
+
}
+
</bibtex>
+
  
=Evidence Gathering=
 
  
* [http://utdallas.edu/~sxs018540/index/docs/byteprints_itcc05.pdf Byteprints: A Tool to Gather Digital Evidence], Sriranjani Sitaraman, Srinivasan Krishnamurthy and S. Venkatesan, Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Technology (ITCC 2005), Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, April 4 - 6, 2005
 
  
=Fake Information=
+
=== Vendor's product overview: ===
 +
Seagate FDE: http://www.seagate.com/docs/pdf/marketing/PO-Momentus-FDE.pdf
  
* [https://analysis.mitre.org/proceedings/Final_Papers_Files/84_Camera_Ready_Paper.pdf Automatic Detection of Fake File Systems], Neil C. Rowe, International Conference on Intelligence Analysis Methods and Tools, McLean, Virginia, May 2005.
+
Network Appliance: http://www.netapp.com/ftp/decru-fileshredding.pdf
  
=Feature Extraction and Data Fusion=
+
NetApps DataFort: http://www.decru.com/products/pdf/dsEseries.pdf
Computer Location Determination Through Geoparsing and Geocoding of
+
Extracted Features
+
http://www2.chadsteel.com:8080/Publications/drive_location2.doc
+
  
 +
Decru Lifetime Key Management: http://www.decru.com/products/ltkm.htm
  
=File Carving=
+
Decru Whitepaper: http://www.forensicswiki.org/images/6/6f/Securing_Storage_White_Paper.pdf
  
* [http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/shanmugasundaram03automatic.html  Automatic Reassembly of Document Fragments via Context Based Statistical Models], Kulesh Shanmugasundaram and Nasir Memon.  
+
Price for Decru DataFort E510 1.6 for NAS: http://infosecuritymag.techtarget.com/ss/0,295796,sid6_iss346_art680,00.html
  
 +
DecruDataFort E440: http://www.computerworld.com/hardwaretopics/storage/story/0,10801,78766,00.html
  
=Text Mining=
+
[[User:Lenageraghty|Lenageraghty]] 22:08, 7 November 2005 (EST)
  
'''Computer Forensic Text Analysis with Open Source Software,''' Christian Johansson, Masters Thesis, Blekinge Tekniska Hogskola, June 2003  http://www.fukt.bth.se/~uncle/papers/master/thesis.pdf
+
=== SAM Useful TCFS site: ===
  
=Signed Evidence=
+
Transparent CryptoGraphical file system: http://www.tcfs.it/index.php?pc=2
<bibtex>
+
@article{duerr-2004,
+
  title="Information Assurance Applied to Authentication of Digital Evidence",
+
  author="Thomas E. Duerr and Nicholas D. Beser and Gregory P. Staisiunas",
+
  year=2004,
+
  journal="Forensic Science Communications",
+
  volume=6,
+
  number=4,
+
  url="http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/oct2004/research/2004_10_research01.htm"
+
}
+
</bibtex>
+
  
 +
TCFS intro: http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/2174
  
<bibtex>
+
--[[User:Samlam|Samlam]] 19:56, 13 November 2005 (EST)
@article{OppligerR03,
+
  author    = {Rolf Oppliger and Ruedi Rytz},
+
  title    = {Digital Evidence: Dream and Reality},
+
  journal  = {IEEE Security {\&} Privacy},
+
  volume    = {1},
+
  number    = {5},
+
  year      = {2003},
+
  pages    = {44-48},
+
  url      = {http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/MSECP.2003.1236234},
+
  abstract="Digital evidence is inherently weak. New evidence-gathering technologies-digital black boxes-must be developed and deployed to support investigations of irreproducible events such as digitally signing a document."
+
}
+
</bibtex>
+
  
=Theory=
+
=== ERIC Seagate new offerings: ===
'''A Hypothesis-Based Approach to Digital Forensic Investigations,''' Brian D. Carrier, Ph.D. Dissertation
+
Full Disk Encryption: http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1825740,00.asp
Purdue University, May 2006 https://www.cerias.purdue.edu/tools_and_resources/bibtex_archive/archive/2006-06.pdf
+
  
=Other Papers=
+
Seagate product specification: http://www.seagate.com/content/docs/pdf/marketing/PO-Momentus-FDE.pdf
  
* [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=531782 A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What is Different About Computer and Network Security?], Peter P. Swire, Moritz College of Law of the Ohio State University, Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law, Vol. 2, 2004.
+
 
 +
[[User:Samlam|Samlam]] 12:10, 13 November 2005 (EST)
 +
 
 +
=== Cryptographcial File Systems: ===
 +
[[File Systems#Cryptographic File Systems]] Readings on crytographical file systems.
 +
 
 +
=== Some Notes from Sam ===
 +
"What is your prognosis for cryptographic file systems?" is a question we have to answer from this project (see project outline). It is important we address that.
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
=== Suggestion of outline : ===
 +
*Introduction (BJ)
 +
**Definition of an Encrypting File System
 +
**Purpose/Goal of an EFS
 +
***Purpose: to add an additional layer of security, controlled by the user, over that user's data
 +
***Goal: to allow users to feel confident the data placed in the EFS cannot be compromised.
 +
**Overview of General Workings
 +
***(description of common functionality and common processes to all or most EFS)
 +
***You have data in memory, you want to save it to disk, you only want "authorized" people to see it; not even system administrators and/or backup operators
 +
***You control access by "owning" the key
 +
***Key is generated (somehow)
 +
***There is overhead in the process of encrypting/decrypting (unavoidable)
 +
**Overview of Common Usage
 +
***Maybe some categories of users and what they are looking for:
 +
***"business critical applications" like databases, etc. where business relies on data being available and secure
 +
***"business users" like managers who want to secure employee reviews, HR people wanting to secure salary information, etc.
 +
***"casual users" people who just want to make sure their data is secure.
 +
**The currently available systems (market share?)
 +
**Why we choose CFS TCFS and Network Applicances
 +
*Study of 3 systems in depth, including why this system is selected for study.
 +
**CFS (LENA)
 +
***Overview
 +
****When Developed
 +
****Platform(s)
 +
****Current Version
 +
***Key Management
 +
***Ease of Use for End Users
 +
***Legal Issues
 +
***Failure Modes
 +
***Challenges in Installation/Use by System Administrator
 +
***Performance
 +
***Cost
 +
***Conclusion (?? what would that be??)
 +
**TCFS (SAM)
 +
***Overview
 +
****When Developed
 +
****Platform(s)
 +
****Current Version
 +
***Key Management
 +
***Ease of Use for End Users
 +
***Legal Issues
 +
***Failure Modes
 +
***Challenges in Installation/Use by System Administrator
 +
***Performance
 +
***Cost
 +
***Conclusion (?? what would that be??)
 +
**Network Appliance DataForte and Seagate (ERIC)
 +
***Overview
 +
****When Developed
 +
****Platform(s)
 +
****Current Version
 +
***Key Management
 +
***Ease of Use for End Users
 +
***Legal Issues
 +
***Failure Modes
 +
***Challenges in Installation/Use by System Administrator
 +
***Performance
 +
***Cost
 +
***Conclusion (?? what would that be??)
 +
*Compare the following:
 +
**Plausibility
 +
**Usability
 +
**Cost
 +
*Common Issues/Problems (ALL)
 +
**Impact on end-users (i.e. what if you are away on a business trip and you have to go to the hospital and all of your files are encrypted on your laptop?) (or even worse, what if you die and all your financial information is encrypted?)
 +
**Impact on business owners (e.g. what if an employee quits and all that person's data files, contact info, etc. are encrypted)
 +
*Future (ALL)
 +
**What would be useful to add or remove
 +
**How we would accomplish the changes we suggest
 +
*Conclusion. (ALL)
 +
 
 +
--[[User:Samlam|Samlam]] 08:06, 17 November 2005 (EST)
 +
 
 +
[[User:Bjl170|Bjl170]] 20:23, 14 November 2005 (EST)
 +
 
 +
[[User:Lenageraghty|Lenageraghty]] 08:36, 11 November 2005 (EST)
 +
 
 +
 
 +
===== some thoughts/comments on the updated outline =====
 +
 
 +
* We are examining 3 cyptographical file system - why do we choose the 3 we choose ?
 +
** Freeware is popular CFS, TCFS is free.
 +
** CFS is quite often referenced.  It is one of the early most widely used system.
 +
** Net Applicance is a commercial system. Possibly an end-to-end solution (?)
 +
** Scope of this project: multi-user file systems, as oppose to a single disk drive system.
 +
** What are some of the existing system ?
 +
 
 +
[[User:Lenageraghty|Lenageraghty]] 23:32, 14 November 2005 (EST)
 +
 
 +
=== Questions : ===
 +
* What systems are currently available ?
 +
 
 +
[[User:Lenageraghty|Lenageraghty]] 08:48, 11 November 2005 (EST)
 +
 
 +
=== Suggestions/Questions/Outline ?: ===
 +
* Solutions from other storage vendors.
 +
* Desirable features for a cryptographical file system.
 +
* cost
 +
** performance
 +
** total solution for end-users
 +
** Key management for cryptographical file system
 +
** Ease of use by end-users
 +
** Failure modes
 +
** Challenges in using/installing
 +
 
 +
[[User:Lenageraghty|Lenageraghty]] 22:48, 7 November 2005 (EST)
 +
 
 +
===== comment from TA (Joe)  =====
 +
That looks like some of the right inroads.  Remember that the paper is
 +
not very long, so you may want to focus on the three systems and do a
 +
deep analysis.  Certainly some things to think about:
 +
      Simson's lecture where he talked about it
 +
      Failure modes of such systems
 +
      Challenges in using/installing
 +
 
 +
''comment from teacher:'' Please remember that this Wiki is publically accessible on the Internet. It's great if you can improve the resource for everbody. But do try to do that, rather than just creating your own space...
 +
 
 +
=== Uploads / Partial drafts of writeup ===
 +
 
 +
[[Image:HelixCFS.doc]] Lena's writeup on CFS
 +
 
 +
Devaition from outline: 
 +
* Did not mention current release, which is not really relevant. (It is 1.4.1 if anyone is interested)
 +
* Describe the security provided by CFS.
 +
* No legal issue.
 +
* Not sure what is meant by failure mode: I assume lost of key ? In any case, we can use backup/restore. Failure is generally taken care of by the system administrator, so failure mode is  part of "ease of user" for the system administrator in my draft. But may be at this point it is too early to decide.
 +
 
 +
 
 +
[[User:Lenageraghty|Lenageraghty]] 23:35, 14 November 2005 (EST)
 +
 
 +
 
 +
[[Image:Init.doc]] Lena's snippet to be integrated into introduction (3 EFS)
 +
 
 +
[[Image:Init2.doc]] Lena's snippet to be integrated into introduction (4 EFS)
 +
 
 +
[[Image:biblio.doc]] Start of a biblio.
 +
 
 +
[[Image:survey.doc]] Snippets to be included into survey (if needed)
 +
 
 +
[[Image:survey3.doc]] Updated snippet.
 +
 
 +
 
 +
[[User:Lenageraghty|Lenageraghty]] 01:08, 16 November 2005 (EST)
 +
 
 +
=== Initial concluding thoughts ===
 +
* Administrators / CSO charged with the operation of high security environments probably don't want to use unsupported software even if they are free.  CFS is free but not supported.
 +
* It is uncommon to run databases on top of cryptographical file systems. Many sensitive information such as payroll/HR are stored in relational databases.  Sensitive fields can be encrypted before storing into the databases.  For high volume transactions such as stock trading etc, performance is important. People probably rely on auditing in attain security rather than use cyptographical file system to do so.
 +
*Whether Cryptographical File system will become popular depends on many factors.
 +
** Are there real inherent problems to Cyptographical File system ?  My feeling is that if there are any deficiencies, they'll all be addressed overtime. There will always be faster hardware, better algorithm, better implementation.  There are already commercial systems available (e.g. DataForte). Ncryptfs has better performance than CFS which is an evidence of improvement overtime.
 +
** Are there pressures from government or businesses that push for commercial adoption of cryptographical file system regardless of cost.  (Someone in livejournal mentions that he sees more pressure nowadays.)  Also, I saw something indications that government may use Seagate's FDE. (See quotes below : Seagate ‘Drives’ Notebook Encryption). Searching on the internet for full disk encryption products, there are plenty.  I think that there has to be a push for disk encryption on notebook and laptops.
 +
** High performance and highly reliable database systems are very expensive. However enterprises and businesses pay for them because the Service Level Agreements and expectations are met by the vendors. The enterprises and businesses have a *need* for these data to be processed by the database.  Is there a real *need* for cryptographical file systems. Are there other combinations that forms a viable solutions without the need for cryptographical file system. For example, if the data are protected in data centers qualified for a certain security level, would that be an acceptable solution in lieu of cryptographical file system? Where best should a CSO / head or IT spend his resources to attain the level of security required.
 +
** Will there be heightened security demands for individuals. Even though notebook encryption disk drive for notebook computers are more expensive than ordinary non-encryption drive, if the price is within an affordable range, users will accept the higher price  for security.  (FDE is $100USD for the drive) Usually for personal items, higher volume of sales implies lower price. The entry barrier will be lowered as there is more demand. Like many electronic devices such as calculator, price comes down over time.
 +
 
 +
<font color="red">Sam's update
 +
** Reduced performance is a major reason as to why secured file system is not widely used. System wide encryption like TCFS creates overheads and can reduce system performance by up to 50%. Performance, key revocation and security infrastructure need to be explored further (Miller et al, 2002).</font>
 +
 
 +
--[[User:Samlam|Samlam]] 00:01, 19 November 2005 (EST)
 +
 
 +
[[User:Lenageraghty|Lenageraghty]] 21:57, 16 November 2005 (EST)
 +
 
 +
=== Harvard Style ===
 +
 
 +
I found something on Harvard citation style (googling)
 +
 
 +
http://www.library.uq.edu.au/training/citation/harvard_6.pdf
 +
 
 +
 
 +
=== Some quotes on news on Seagate : Nov. 17, 2005===
 +
 
 +
 
 +
Seagate ‘Drives’ Notebook Encryption
 +
Seagate Technology, a Scotts Valley, CA-based hard disc drive manufacturer, has developed hardware-based full disc encryption (FDE) for notebook PCs, a technology that could be attractive to government users. Company officials said its Momentus 5400 FDE 2.5-inch hard drive provides protection against unauthorized access to data on stolen or retired notebook PCs.
 +
 +
“We anticipate the earliest of the adopters to be in government and commercial spaces,” said Mark Pastor, Seagate’s director of strategic marketing. “It’s a very user-friendly, comprehensive approach to encrypting data on the hard drive.”
 +
 +
Rather than use software and make a conscious effort to protect specific data, FDE technology requires only a user key to encrypt all data on the drive, he said. The encryption functions, including the password or user key, are performed on the drive, not the operating system, providing additional security from hackers. If the notebook is disposed of or repurposed, the key that is used for encrypting the data would be removed.
 +
 +
“Deleting the key effectively removes the chance that data would then be readable by anybody,” Pastor said.
 +
 +
Seagate began putting the FDE in notebooks first because there use is growing and because their portability makes them vulnerable to loss or theft. But Pastor said Seagate also sees a need for hardware-based FDE in desktop and handheld device environments.
 +
 +
Seagate expects the first Momentus 5400 FDE hard drives to start shipping early next year. In the meantime, it is working with vendors to further develop the product for their needs. Lee, MA-based Wave Systems and Utimaco Safeware AG, of Oberusel, Germany, have announced they are incorporating the FDE hard drives in their products.   
 +
 
 +
Quoted from http://www.gsnmagazine.com/oct_05_02/high_speed.html (Online, Nov 13)
 +
 
 +
=== Draft: This Is About 4 1/2 Pages ===
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
[[Image:Draft_Paper.doc]]
 +
 
 +
=== End of Draft ===
 +
From earlier:
 +
 
 +
Some Notes from Sam
 +
 
 +
"What is your prognosis for cryptographic file systems?" is a question we have to answer from this project (see project outline). It is important we address that.
 +
 
 +
So this is going to be our discussion.  Any ideas as to what we want to put in this?
 +
 
 +
 
 +
Sam: I think your concluding thoughts are good and I'll add my prognosis in my concluding thoughts.
 +
--[[User:Samlam|Samlam]] 23:49, 18 November 2005 (EST)
 +
 
 +
<B><em>I had some concluding thoughts in earlier section.  </em></B>

Revision as of 23:56, 20 November 2005

The danger in using a wiki as a collaboration tool is that other people will edit it.

Information on cryptographic file system was moved to File Systems#Cryptographic File Systems


Vendor's product overview:

Seagate FDE: http://www.seagate.com/docs/pdf/marketing/PO-Momentus-FDE.pdf

Network Appliance: http://www.netapp.com/ftp/decru-fileshredding.pdf

NetApps DataFort: http://www.decru.com/products/pdf/dsEseries.pdf

Decru Lifetime Key Management: http://www.decru.com/products/ltkm.htm

Decru Whitepaper: http://www.forensicswiki.org/images/6/6f/Securing_Storage_White_Paper.pdf

Price for Decru DataFort E510 1.6 for NAS: http://infosecuritymag.techtarget.com/ss/0,295796,sid6_iss346_art680,00.html

DecruDataFort E440: http://www.computerworld.com/hardwaretopics/storage/story/0,10801,78766,00.html

Lenageraghty 22:08, 7 November 2005 (EST)

SAM Useful TCFS site:

Transparent CryptoGraphical file system: http://www.tcfs.it/index.php?pc=2

TCFS intro: http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/2174

--Samlam 19:56, 13 November 2005 (EST)

ERIC Seagate new offerings:

Full Disk Encryption: http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1825740,00.asp

Seagate product specification: http://www.seagate.com/content/docs/pdf/marketing/PO-Momentus-FDE.pdf


Samlam 12:10, 13 November 2005 (EST)

Cryptographcial File Systems:

File Systems#Cryptographic File Systems Readings on crytographical file systems.

Some Notes from Sam

"What is your prognosis for cryptographic file systems?" is a question we have to answer from this project (see project outline). It is important we address that.




Suggestion of outline :

  • Introduction (BJ)
    • Definition of an Encrypting File System
    • Purpose/Goal of an EFS
      • Purpose: to add an additional layer of security, controlled by the user, over that user's data
      • Goal: to allow users to feel confident the data placed in the EFS cannot be compromised.
    • Overview of General Workings
      • (description of common functionality and common processes to all or most EFS)
      • You have data in memory, you want to save it to disk, you only want "authorized" people to see it; not even system administrators and/or backup operators
      • You control access by "owning" the key
      • Key is generated (somehow)
      • There is overhead in the process of encrypting/decrypting (unavoidable)
    • Overview of Common Usage
      • Maybe some categories of users and what they are looking for:
      • "business critical applications" like databases, etc. where business relies on data being available and secure
      • "business users" like managers who want to secure employee reviews, HR people wanting to secure salary information, etc.
      • "casual users" people who just want to make sure their data is secure.
    • The currently available systems (market share?)
    • Why we choose CFS TCFS and Network Applicances
  • Study of 3 systems in depth, including why this system is selected for study.
    • CFS (LENA)
      • Overview
        • When Developed
        • Platform(s)
        • Current Version
      • Key Management
      • Ease of Use for End Users
      • Legal Issues
      • Failure Modes
      • Challenges in Installation/Use by System Administrator
      • Performance
      • Cost
      • Conclusion (?? what would that be??)
    • TCFS (SAM)
      • Overview
        • When Developed
        • Platform(s)
        • Current Version
      • Key Management
      • Ease of Use for End Users
      • Legal Issues
      • Failure Modes
      • Challenges in Installation/Use by System Administrator
      • Performance
      • Cost
      • Conclusion (?? what would that be??)
    • Network Appliance DataForte and Seagate (ERIC)
      • Overview
        • When Developed
        • Platform(s)
        • Current Version
      • Key Management
      • Ease of Use for End Users
      • Legal Issues
      • Failure Modes
      • Challenges in Installation/Use by System Administrator
      • Performance
      • Cost
      • Conclusion (?? what would that be??)
  • Compare the following:
    • Plausibility
    • Usability
    • Cost
  • Common Issues/Problems (ALL)
    • Impact on end-users (i.e. what if you are away on a business trip and you have to go to the hospital and all of your files are encrypted on your laptop?) (or even worse, what if you die and all your financial information is encrypted?)
    • Impact on business owners (e.g. what if an employee quits and all that person's data files, contact info, etc. are encrypted)
  • Future (ALL)
    • What would be useful to add or remove
    • How we would accomplish the changes we suggest
  • Conclusion. (ALL)

--Samlam 08:06, 17 November 2005 (EST)

Bjl170 20:23, 14 November 2005 (EST)

Lenageraghty 08:36, 11 November 2005 (EST)


some thoughts/comments on the updated outline
  • We are examining 3 cyptographical file system - why do we choose the 3 we choose ?
    • Freeware is popular CFS, TCFS is free.
    • CFS is quite often referenced. It is one of the early most widely used system.
    • Net Applicance is a commercial system. Possibly an end-to-end solution (?)
    • Scope of this project: multi-user file systems, as oppose to a single disk drive system.
    • What are some of the existing system ?

Lenageraghty 23:32, 14 November 2005 (EST)

Questions :

  • What systems are currently available ?

Lenageraghty 08:48, 11 November 2005 (EST)

Suggestions/Questions/Outline ?:

  • Solutions from other storage vendors.
  • Desirable features for a cryptographical file system.
  • cost
    • performance
    • total solution for end-users
    • Key management for cryptographical file system
    • Ease of use by end-users
    • Failure modes
    • Challenges in using/installing

Lenageraghty 22:48, 7 November 2005 (EST)

comment from TA (Joe)

That looks like some of the right inroads. Remember that the paper is not very long, so you may want to focus on the three systems and do a deep analysis. Certainly some things to think about:

      Simson's lecture where he talked about it
      Failure modes of such systems
      Challenges in using/installing

comment from teacher: Please remember that this Wiki is publically accessible on the Internet. It's great if you can improve the resource for everbody. But do try to do that, rather than just creating your own space...

Uploads / Partial drafts of writeup

File:HelixCFS.doc Lena's writeup on CFS

Devaition from outline:

  • Did not mention current release, which is not really relevant. (It is 1.4.1 if anyone is interested)
  • Describe the security provided by CFS.
  • No legal issue.
  • Not sure what is meant by failure mode: I assume lost of key ? In any case, we can use backup/restore. Failure is generally taken care of by the system administrator, so failure mode is part of "ease of user" for the system administrator in my draft. But may be at this point it is too early to decide.


Lenageraghty 23:35, 14 November 2005 (EST)


File:Init.doc Lena's snippet to be integrated into introduction (3 EFS)

File:Init2.doc Lena's snippet to be integrated into introduction (4 EFS)

File:Biblio.doc Start of a biblio.

File:Survey.doc Snippets to be included into survey (if needed)

File:Survey3.doc Updated snippet.


Lenageraghty 01:08, 16 November 2005 (EST)

Initial concluding thoughts

  • Administrators / CSO charged with the operation of high security environments probably don't want to use unsupported software even if they are free. CFS is free but not supported.
  • It is uncommon to run databases on top of cryptographical file systems. Many sensitive information such as payroll/HR are stored in relational databases. Sensitive fields can be encrypted before storing into the databases. For high volume transactions such as stock trading etc, performance is important. People probably rely on auditing in attain security rather than use cyptographical file system to do so.
  • Whether Cryptographical File system will become popular depends on many factors.
    • Are there real inherent problems to Cyptographical File system ? My feeling is that if there are any deficiencies, they'll all be addressed overtime. There will always be faster hardware, better algorithm, better implementation. There are already commercial systems available (e.g. DataForte). Ncryptfs has better performance than CFS which is an evidence of improvement overtime.
    • Are there pressures from government or businesses that push for commercial adoption of cryptographical file system regardless of cost. (Someone in livejournal mentions that he sees more pressure nowadays.) Also, I saw something indications that government may use Seagate's FDE. (See quotes below : Seagate ‘Drives’ Notebook Encryption). Searching on the internet for full disk encryption products, there are plenty. I think that there has to be a push for disk encryption on notebook and laptops.
    • High performance and highly reliable database systems are very expensive. However enterprises and businesses pay for them because the Service Level Agreements and expectations are met by the vendors. The enterprises and businesses have a *need* for these data to be processed by the database. Is there a real *need* for cryptographical file systems. Are there other combinations that forms a viable solutions without the need for cryptographical file system. For example, if the data are protected in data centers qualified for a certain security level, would that be an acceptable solution in lieu of cryptographical file system? Where best should a CSO / head or IT spend his resources to attain the level of security required.
    • Will there be heightened security demands for individuals. Even though notebook encryption disk drive for notebook computers are more expensive than ordinary non-encryption drive, if the price is within an affordable range, users will accept the higher price for security. (FDE is $100USD for the drive) Usually for personal items, higher volume of sales implies lower price. The entry barrier will be lowered as there is more demand. Like many electronic devices such as calculator, price comes down over time.

Sam's update

    • Reduced performance is a major reason as to why secured file system is not widely used. System wide encryption like TCFS creates overheads and can reduce system performance by up to 50%. Performance, key revocation and security infrastructure need to be explored further (Miller et al, 2002).

--Samlam 00:01, 19 November 2005 (EST)

Lenageraghty 21:57, 16 November 2005 (EST)

Harvard Style

I found something on Harvard citation style (googling)

http://www.library.uq.edu.au/training/citation/harvard_6.pdf


Some quotes on news on Seagate : Nov. 17, 2005

Seagate ‘Drives’ Notebook Encryption Seagate Technology, a Scotts Valley, CA-based hard disc drive manufacturer, has developed hardware-based full disc encryption (FDE) for notebook PCs, a technology that could be attractive to government users. Company officials said its Momentus 5400 FDE 2.5-inch hard drive provides protection against unauthorized access to data on stolen or retired notebook PCs.

“We anticipate the earliest of the adopters to be in government and commercial spaces,” said Mark Pastor, Seagate’s director of strategic marketing. “It’s a very user-friendly, comprehensive approach to encrypting data on the hard drive.”

Rather than use software and make a conscious effort to protect specific data, FDE technology requires only a user key to encrypt all data on the drive, he said. The encryption functions, including the password or user key, are performed on the drive, not the operating system, providing additional security from hackers. If the notebook is disposed of or repurposed, the key that is used for encrypting the data would be removed.

“Deleting the key effectively removes the chance that data would then be readable by anybody,” Pastor said.

Seagate began putting the FDE in notebooks first because there use is growing and because their portability makes them vulnerable to loss or theft. But Pastor said Seagate also sees a need for hardware-based FDE in desktop and handheld device environments.

Seagate expects the first Momentus 5400 FDE hard drives to start shipping early next year. In the meantime, it is working with vendors to further develop the product for their needs. Lee, MA-based Wave Systems and Utimaco Safeware AG, of Oberusel, Germany, have announced they are incorporating the FDE hard drives in their products.

Quoted from http://www.gsnmagazine.com/oct_05_02/high_speed.html (Online, Nov 13)

Draft: This Is About 4 1/2 Pages

File:Draft Paper.doc

End of Draft

From earlier:

Some Notes from Sam

"What is your prognosis for cryptographic file systems?" is a question we have to answer from this project (see project outline). It is important we address that.

So this is going to be our discussion. Any ideas as to what we want to put in this?


Sam: I think your concluding thoughts are good and I'll add my prognosis in my concluding thoughts. --Samlam 23:49, 18 November 2005 (EST)

I had some concluding thoughts in earlier section.