Difference between revisions of "The Onion Router"

From ForensicsWiki
Jump to: navigation, search
m (added category)
m (correct link to Metasploit Decloaking Engine)
 
(One intermediate revision by the same user not shown)
Line 15: Line 15:
  
 
* Web browsers
 
* Web browsers
** Enabled scripts: Java and Flash applets may leak real IP address (see [http://metasploit.com/research/projects/decloak/ Metasploit Decloaking Engine]);
+
** Enabled scripts: Java and Flash applets may leak real IP address (see [http://decloak.net/ Metasploit Decloaking Engine]);
 
** Enabled cookies: web server can identify clients using unique cookies.
 
** Enabled cookies: web server can identify clients using unique cookies.
  
Line 42: Line 42:
 
* [http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/oakland05torta.pdf Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor (University of Cambridge)]
 
* [http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/oakland05torta.pdf Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor (University of Cambridge)]
  
 +
[[Category:Anti-Forensics]]
 
[[Category:Anti-forensics tools]]
 
[[Category:Anti-forensics tools]]
 +
[[Category:Network Forensics]]
 +
[[Category:Encryption]]

Latest revision as of 15:43, 2 February 2009

Tor (The Onion Router) is an implementation of second-generation onion routing.

Overview

Tor is a distributed censorship-resistant network designed to anonymize TCP-based applications.

Attacks

Timing attacks

Tor fails when the attacker can correlate timing patterns on both ends of the communications channel.

Misconfigured software

  • DNS leaks

Some applications do name resolution directly (bypassing Tor proxy). In this case lookup requests leak significant information (e.g. web site being visited).

  • Web browsers
    • Enabled scripts: Java and Flash applets may leak real IP address (see Metasploit Decloaking Engine);
    • Enabled cookies: web server can identify clients using unique cookies.

TLS attacks

Various deviations of system time can be detected in TLS traffic (e.g. HTTPS traffic). Attacker can modify system time of the target computer (or group of them) via NTP and easily trace TLS connections from anonymous network.

Eavesdropping by exit nodes

Tor doesn't encrypt traffic between an exit node and the target server, so exit nodes are able to capture all unencrypted traffic. Malicious exit nodes can perform man-in-the-middle attacks on encrypted protocols.

Hidden services

Location hidden services are also vulnerable to timing correlation attack.

External Links