Difference between pages "UPSEC 08" and "Talk:Linux Logical Volume Manager (LVM)"

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m (New page: CALL FOR PAPERS Usability, Psychology, and Security 2008 April 14, 2008 San Francisco, CA, USA Sponsored by USENIX, The Advanced Computing Systems Association Co-located with the 5th US...)
 
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CALL FOR PAPERS
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Should we change
  
Usability, Psychology, and Security 2008
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:To make the volume group known to the system
April 14, 2008
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:vgexport $VOLUMEGROUP
San Francisco, CA, USA
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Sponsored by USENIX, The Advanced Computing Systems Association
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to
  
Co-located with the 5th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design 
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:To make the volume group known to the system
& Implementation (NSDI '08), which will take place April 16-18, 2008, 
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:vgimport $VOLUMEGROUP
and the First USENIX Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent 
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?
Threats (LEET '08), which will take place April 15, 2008
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IMPORTANT DATES
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vgexport makes volume groups ''unknown'' to the system, vgimport makes exported volumes ''known'' to the system. See also [http://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/LVM-HOWTO/recipemovevgtonewsys.html this]. You should also remember, that both vgexport/vgimport alter the data on the physical device. I also added "loop" option to the mount command example, since "-o ro" may alter the data in the file system (replay the journal, etc) [[User:.FUF|.FUF]] ([[User talk:.FUF|talk]]) 10:19, 7 May 2014 (CDT)
Submissions due: January 18, 2008
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Notification of acceptance: February 28, 2008
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Final papers due: March 18, 2008
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WORKSHOP ORGANIZERS
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Program Chairs
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Elizabeth Churchill, Yahoo! Research
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Rachna Dhamija, Harvard University
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Program Committee
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Steven M. Bellovin, Columbia University
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Dan Boneh, Stanford University
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Coye Cheshire, University of California, Berkeley
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Julie Downs, Carnegie Mellon University
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Stuart Schechter, Microsoft Research
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Sean Smith, Dartmouth University
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J.D. Tygar, University of California, Berkeley
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Paul Van Oorschot, Carleton University
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OVERVIEW
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Information security involves both technology and people. To design 
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and deploy secure systems, we require an understanding of how users 
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of those systems perceive, understand, and act on security risks and 
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threats.
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This one-day workshop will bring together an interdisciplinary group 
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of researchers, systems designers, and developers to discuss how the
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fields of human computer interaction, applied psychology, and 
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computer security can be brought together to inform innovations in 
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secure systems design. We seek to deepen the conversation about 
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usable security to go beyond the user interface, toward developing 
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useful and usable systems of humans and technology.
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TOPICS
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Topics include but are not limited to:
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- Error detection and recovery
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- Human perception and cognitive information processing
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- Identity and impression management
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- Individual and cultural differences
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- Information seeking and evaluation
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- Judgment and decision-making
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- Learning, training, and experience
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- Mental models
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- Models of privacy, sharing, and trust
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- Organizational, group, and individual behavior
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- Risk perception, risk analysis, and risk communication
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- Security behavior study methodology
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- Social engineering
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- Social influence and persuasion
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- System proposals and design approaches
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- Threat evaluation
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- Usability
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- User motivation and incentives for secure behavior
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The study of human attention, learning, reasoning, and behavior 
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addresses issues of central relevance to computer security. For example:
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- Security weaknesses often arise from biases in human perception and 
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cognitive information processing. For example, phishing attacks use 
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confusing perceptual cues and fear to trick users into revealing 
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sensitive information.
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- Assessing, creating, and managing secure systems requires ongoing 
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information seeking and information evaluation, as new threats emerge 
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constantly. However, understanding complex and dynamic systems is 
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time-consuming and error-prone, and users have little motivation to 
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spend the time and effort that is required.
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- The perception of risk can influence users' willingness to employ 
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security mechanisms or engage in risky behavior. However, risk 
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perception and decision-making are often based on limited domain 
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knowledge and are subject to bias; we underestimate some risks and 
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exaggerate others.
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- People's level of confidence in their risk assessments can be 
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perceptually and socially manipulated, independent of actual risks. 
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Attackers (and system designers) often create the perception of 
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security, even when none exists.
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- Human reasoning follows certain patterns, which are subject to
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change with experience. Through training and education, we can help 
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users to learn methods and procedures and develop mental models of 
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how security systems work.
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- People learn through interaction with others. Models of social 
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influence suggest that information garnered from a trusted source can 
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affect people's behavior or attitudes, but the level of trust 
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conferred on others is dependent on situational factors.
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Organizational factors and group behavior can also have a large 
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effect on individual behavior.
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- Approaches to risk assessment, identity and impression management, 
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and trust vary from one individual to another and also vary by culture.
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SUBMISSIONS
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Usability, Psychology, and Security 2008 invites insightful new 
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contributions that apply aspects of human/computer interaction and 
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applied psychology to solving problems in computer security. We 
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invite submissions in two categories.
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1. Short papers: We encourage short papers that describe innovative 
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work in progress or position papers that map out directions for 
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future research or design. Short papers should be no longer than five 
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(5) pages.
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2. Full papers: Full papers may describe systems, case studies, 
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fieldwork descriptions, experimental studies, and design frameworks. 
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Full papers must be no longer than ten (10) single-spaced 8.5" x 11" 
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pages, including figures, tables, and references.
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All submissions should offer new contributions that have not been 
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published elsewhere. Author names and affiliations should appear on 
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the title page. Submissions must be in PDF and must be submitted via 
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the form on the Usability, Psychology, and Security 2008 Call for 
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Papers Web site:
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http://www.usenix.org/upsec08/cfp
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Papers accompanied by nondisclosure agreement forms will not be 
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considered. All submissions will be treated as confidential prior to 
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publication in the Proceedings.
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Simultaneous submission of the same work to multiple venues, 
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submission of previously published work, and plagiarism constitute 
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dishonesty or fraud. USENIX, like other scientific and technical 
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conferences and journals, prohibits these practices and may, on the
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recommendation of a program chair, take action against authors who 
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have committed them. In some cases, program committees may share 
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information about submitted papers with other conference chairs and 
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journal editors to ensure the integrity of papers under 
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consideration. If a violation of these principles is found, sanctions 
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may include, but are not limited to, barring the authors from 
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submitting to or participating in USENIX conferences for a set 
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period, contacting the authors' institutions, and publicizing the
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details of the case.
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Note, however, that we expect that many papers accepted for the 
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workshop will eventually be extended as full papers suitable for 
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presentation at future conferences.
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Authors uncertain whether their submission meets USENIX's guidelines 
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should contact the Program Chairs, upsec08chairs@usenix.org, or the 
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USENIX office, submissionspolicy@usenix.org.
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HISTORY
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This workshop evolved from Usable Security (USEC'07). The USEC'07 
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program and papers are available on the workshop Web site:
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http://www.usablesecurity.org/
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Latest revision as of 10:19, 7 May 2014

Should we change

To make the volume group known to the system
vgexport $VOLUMEGROUP

to

To make the volume group known to the system
vgimport $VOLUMEGROUP

?

vgexport makes volume groups unknown to the system, vgimport makes exported volumes known to the system. See also this. You should also remember, that both vgexport/vgimport alter the data on the physical device. I also added "loop" option to the mount command example, since "-o ro" may alter the data in the file system (replay the journal, etc) .FUF (talk) 10:19, 7 May 2014 (CDT)